25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01672R000200120007-5

R A F

- A sold of here

3 June 1970

SUBJECT: Strategy for Convoking on International Conference on Indochina

I. It is difficult to discuss the pros and cons of the alternative approaches for convoking on international conference on Indochina without

(a) Making assumptions with respect to the primary U.S. purpose behind the effort.

- (b) The readiness of the U.S. and Hanoi to move away from basic positions which both sides have adherred to firmly throughout the Paris talks.
- 2. The draft paper seems implicitly to assume that Hanoi's readiness to negotiate has been increased by recent developments in Cambodia and that there are additional levers of influence which the U.S. could manipulate to cause Hanoi to accept and participate in an international conference after U.S. forces withdraw from Cambodia. We believe these assumptions would prove false, at least during the summer of 1970. It is possible that Hanoi will be willing at some later date to reach a compromise political solution in South Vietnam but it is not likely to respond to any call for an international conferences in circumstances where its bargaining position appears weakened.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP80T01672R000200120007-5

Hanoi would, of course, welcome an international conference if it had been assured in advance that the U.S. purpose was to use the conference as a cover for making major concessions and withdrawing from Vietnam. But if the primary purpose of the U.S. Government was to improve its domestic and international image, Hanoi could be expected to discern this fact and rebuff any call for a conference.

II. Pros and Cons of the Four Approaches

A. CASE I -- A public U.S. call for a conference

PROS (a) A public call would be well received in much of the non-Communist world but this favorable reception would be limited.

CONS (a) There have already been calls for an international conference; a U.S. initiative would probably be viewed primary as a propaganda move unless it soon brought results.

- (b) Hanoi, not having been consulted in advance, would denounce the U.S. action as meaningless.
- (c) Result of this approach, in the absence of advance understandings with Hanoi would tend to prejudice the future usefulness of the international conference mechanism.

(1)

- CASE 2 -- Enlist the assistance of the Secretary General, the French, and/or the Co-chairman
 - PROS (a) Public knowledge of this U.S. initiative might have some marginal beneficial effects in the non-Communist world on the U.S. image.
 - CONS (a) None of these intermediaries have any particular influence on Hanoi; Hanoi would not view a U.S. appeal to them as a serious, non-propagandistic effort. If the U.S. had some new substantive proposals to put to Hanoi, there are better channels available.
- CASE 3 -- Secret discussions with the Soviets
 - PROS (a) Soviets are in direct contact with Hanoi

 US

 and could provide a secure channel for indirect communication

 with Hanoi.
 - (b) Soviets have some interest in containing Indochina conflict and limiting Chinese influence in Hanoi.
 - (c) Soviets can exercise some influence on Hanoi.
 - CONS (a) Soviets not entirely reliable as intermediaries; their interests not parrallel or common with U.S.
 - (b) Soviets not willing exert any real pressure on Hanoi.
 - (c) Hanoi might not wish work through Soviets because of its problems in balancing relations with Peking. Hanoi might prefer contact through Norweighs or direct private talks Approved 5 or Repease 2004/07/08 UCIA-RDPS CO1673RA9020012080775 to

say "which would make it possible for an international conference
to be convoked and for the presence of North Vietnam to be assured."

CASE 4 -- Direct talks in Paris through a senior U.S. Political
Figure

- PROS (a) Naming of a senior U.S. figure to Paris talks delegation would permit Hanoi return to return its senior negotiators without loss of face.
- (b) If Hanoi is in mood to explore ways and means of a Vietnam or Indochina settlement on a serious basis, arrival of a senior U.S. figure in Paris would provide them pretext for making a private approach without giving public appearance of moving from weakness.
- (c) Direct talks in Paris would permit exploration of possibilities for an Indochina conference while reducing the risks of miscunderstanding inherent in use of intermediaries.
- (d) Only basis for convoking an international conference is to secure Hanoi's agreement in advance; direct private talks are most reliable channels to accomplish this objective.


 If effort fails, future prospects for a conference not necessarily harmed.
- (e) Appointment of a senior negotiator would, by itself, produce positive reaction in non-Communist world and would be viewed as a serious non-propagandistic step.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01672R000200120007-5

CONS (a) Hanoi might read appointment of senior U.S. figure as sign of weakness on U.S. side.

(b) Senior political figure might not be familiar with history of Paris negotiations and might create misunderstandings by inadvertent compromise of U.S. or GVN politions in private talks.

25X1



(c)